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INTRODUCTION
Piracy on the high seas is one of the oldest problems that early jurists of
international law, such as Hugo Grotius, addressed in the early part of the
In addition to legal accountability, Grotius
seventeenth century. 1
advocated for the use of force to combat piracy and robbery at sea.2 Today,
early in the twenty–first century, the nations of the world are again
confronted with piracy on the high seas. Piracy off the coast of Somalia
brings renewed attention to the relationship between the use of force and
freedom of commerce. To complement the use of force in countering
piracy, Kenya has until recently served as the international piracy court.3
This Article examines how the use of force and the prosecution of pirates
are operating in tandem in one of the latest experiments in international
justice.
Just as Grotius advocated using force to safeguard Dutch freedom of
commerce on the high seas, the European Union (EU) has taken steps—
unprecedented in the modern era—by deciding to authorize the use of force
to combat Somali piracy.
The United Nations Security Council
authorizations, supplemented by several EU directives, extend beyond
international waters to permit hot pursuit into Somalia’s territorial waters
and territory. 4 Neighboring Kenya has also invoked its rights to use force
1. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 631 (James Brown Scott
ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1964) (1925) (distinguishing pirates
from members of a state who act unjustly on the grounds that pirates band together for
wrongdoing).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. At the end of 2009, Kenya began declining to accept any more piracy suspects on
the grounds that it had taken more than its fair share of the global burden in prosecuting
piracy suspects. See Somali Piracy Cases Stall Over AG Remarks, DAILY NATION (Kenya),
Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/893802/-/vsele4/-/index.html (reporting
the confusion in Kenyan courts over whether new trials were authorized); see also AG
Queried over Country’s Role on Piracy Cases, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Mar. 30, 2010,
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201003300855.html.
4. See Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 330) 19 (EU) (approving
European Union military operations to deter and prevent piracy off the coast of Somalia);
see also Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 252) 40 (EU) (directing
the European Union to conduct coordinated military actions pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1816); Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 301)
34 (EU) (authorizing the European Union military to operate up to 500 nautical miles from
the Somali coast). The United Nations Security Council has also passed resolutions in
response to Somali piracy. See S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008)
(authorizing states to take “all necessary measures” to interdict individuals using Somali
territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, as
long as they provide prior notification to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government); S.C.
Res. 1846, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (authorizing states and international
organizations to use all necessary means to combat piracy and robbery within Somalia’s
territorial waters and noting that such authorization was procured with the consent of
Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government). These authorizations run for a period of
twelve months beginning on December 19, 2008. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1853, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
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to combat piracy off the Somali coast 5 while at the same time agreeing, for
self–interested reasons, to prosecute piracy suspects. For analogous selfinterested reasons, private security contractors argue that they are better
suited to address the piracy menace and could do so at much lower costs. 6
Some ship owners, trade organizations, and government officials have
argued that commercial vessels should be armed to ward off piracy
attacks, 7 while others warn against such actions.8 The Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia has consented to forcible measures against piracy
occurring within its territorial waters and territory. 9 For its part, the United
States, which is coordinating the military effort against piracy, has
announced it will use unmanned drones to aid the global antipiracy effort.10
Combating piracy exemplifies the continued expansion and
legitimization of the use of force against non-state actors, in this instance to

S/RES/1853 (Dec. 19, 2008). For more on these resolutions, see Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law
of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
399, 402-08 (2009) (outlining and explaining U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1816,
1851, and 1846); see also Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off
the
Coast
of
Somalia,
ASIL
INSIGHTS,
Feb.
6,
2009,
http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm.
5. See James Gathii, Kenya’s Piracy Prosecutions Under International Law, 104 AM.
J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2010).
6. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, Blackwater USA Joins Fight Against Sea Piracy, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at B1.
7. See Patraeus: Shippers Should Consider Armed Guards, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr.
25, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/25/petraeus-shippers-consider-armedguards/ (reporting that General David Petraeus, Commander of the U.S. Central Command,
told a House of Representatives committee that ship owners should consider arming their
crews); Jonathan Saul, Shippers Weigh Armed Response to Somali Piracy, REUTERS, June 3,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSL31024866 (reporting on the
growing trend of shipping companies arming their crews); Andrea Stone, Capt. Phillips
Calls for Arming Ship Officers, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2009, at 4A (reporting that Captain
Richard Phillips, the captain of the Maersk Alabama when it was taken hostage by pirates in
April, 2009, “believe[s] that arming the crew, as part of an overall strategy, could provide an
effective deterrent under certain circumstances”).
8. See Anita Powell, Ships Have Few Options Against Somali Pirates, USA TODAY,
Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/africa/2009-04-10-4236836427_x.htm
(reporting that Noel Choong, director of the International Maritime Bureau, believes that
arming ships would only increase risks); MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION, REVISED GUIDANCE ON COMBATING PIRACY AGREED BY IMO
MARITIME
SAFETY
COMMITTEE
(2009),
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=11478
(urging
“[s]tates [to] strongly discourage the carrying and use of firearms by seafarers for personal
protection or for the protection of a ship. Seafarers . . . are civilians and the use of firearms
requires special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on
board ship is great. Carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry
firearms or even more dangerous weapons, thereby escalating an already dangerous
situation. Any firearm on board may itself become an attractive target for an attacker.
Carriage of firearms may pose an even greater danger if the ship is carrying flammable
cargo or similar types of dangerous goods”).
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Mark Thompson, The Pentagon’s Newest Weapon Against Pirates, TIME, Sept. 4,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1920459,00.html.
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protect freedom of commerce on the high seas.11 The use of force is one of
the best examples of a jus cogens norm, or “the most fundamental and
highly valued interests of international society.”12 Using force to safeguard
freedom of commerce on the high seas demonstrates the primacy and
significance of the issue, not only under international law, but also as
expressed by the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.
Problematically, the same importance has not been placed on the
reconstruction of the Somali government, the instability of which is directly
related to the expansion of piracy. 13 By embracing the use of force to
combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, states have favored the interests of
safety in commerce—undoubtedly an important goal—while paying much
less attention to the crisis that has engulfed Somalia.
This Article has two primary objectives. The first is to trace the use of
force to protect the freedom of traversing the high seas and the right to
engage in commerce. This historical context shows that the use of force
against piracy off the coast of Somalia is not unprecedented. However,
given the increase in military capabilities and the lethality of war since
Grotius’s time in the early seventeenth century and of Thomas Jefferson in
the early nineteenth century, the use of force against piracy must adhere to
the requirements of necessity and proportionality. As Judge Tullio Treves
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has recently argued,
force to combat piracy must be deployed in a manner that respects
international human rights. 14
The second objective of this Article is to explore the many double
11. Terrorism is another context in which the use of force against nonstate actors has
arisen. See James Gathii, Irregulars and the Use of Force, in THE MEANING OF ARMED
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mary O’Connell ed., forthcoming 2010).
12. Gordon Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International
Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 (1988). But see Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 376 (2009) (arguing that the
prohibition of piracy is not a jus cogens norm because piracy is a private, not statesponsored, act).
13. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expresses Intention to
Establish Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia, U.N. Doc. SC/9574 (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9574.doc.htm (reporting the views of Somalia’s
United Nations representative that “if the international community placed the acknowledged
priority of a comprehensive peace on the ground ahead of its efforts to help the Somali
Government promote and ensure stability and political progress in the meantime, ‘it might
take another 10 years’”).
14. See Treves, supra note 4, at 414 (noting that the consideration of human rights
issues is a growing trend in Law of the Sea decisions); see also Michael Bahar, As Necessity
Creates the Rule: Eisentrager, Boumediene, and the Enemy—How Strategic Realities Can
Constitutionally Require Greater Rights for Detainees in the Wars of the Twenty-First
Century, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 286-89 (2009) (arguing that at the time the U.S.
Constitution was signed, “[a]ny nation had a right and obligation to repress pirates, with
their warships, wherever on the seas they were found—a rule [that is] still in effect today[,]”
and that “[p]irates could not be detained indefinitely as prisoners of war, but were to be
prosecuted according to domestic piracy statutes and criminal procedures”).
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standards faced by piracy suspects captured off the coast of Somalia during
their ongoing prosecutions in Kenya. I argue that the relatively lower
protections for defendants under Kenyan law provide an important safety
valve for successful piracy prosecutions that would be hard fought in the
United States and Europe. In so doing, this Article examines the problems
besetting the piracy prosecutions in Kenya, including the propriety of long
periods of pre–trial detention; the complications of gathering evidence on
the high seas; the problem of witness attendance at the trials and its
implications on the right to speedy trials; the legal issues relating to
identifying the proper complainants; the overreaching of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as a third party in the
prosecutions; the legal limitations on the production of video evidence; the
decision by Kenyan courts to take judicial notice of certain facts rather than
have the prosecution prove them; and the allegations of torture and
mistreatment of the piracy suspects.
Part I of this Article examines the justification for the use of force at sea,
beginning primarily with Hugo Grotius’s work. This section also lays out
some of the historical context regarding Somali piracy. Part II then
examines how capturing states have used Kenya’s self–serving assumption
of jurisdiction over piracy suspects to avoid the more stringent procedural
and substantive legal protections for criminal defendants in the United
States and Europe. Part III provides an in-depth look at some particular
procedural hurdles that the Kenyan piracy prosecutions face. The Article
concludes that this grand experiment in international justice is proceeding
less than smoothly.
I.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. Freedom of the High Seas and Commerce
Modern international lawyers often trace the idea of freedom of the high
seas to Hugo Grotius. 15 Grotius’s support for freedom of the high seas in
15. See, e.g., R.P. Anand, Maritime Practice in South-East Asia Until 1600 A.D. and
the Modern Law of the Sea, 30 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 440, 440 (1981) (referencing Grotius’s
Mare Liberum, which was published in 1609); David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D.
Eisen, The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 78-79 (2007) (explaining
that Grotius linked freedom of the high seas to “the essential natural laws of self-defense
and self-preservation”); Ileana M. Porras, Constructing International Law in the East Indian
Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae—The
Law of Prize and Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates”, 31 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 741, 742-73 (2006) (calling Grotius “the father of international law” as a result of
his development of such principles as freedom of the high seas); Cdr. David G. Wilson,
Interdiction on the High Seas: The Role and Authority of a Master in the Boarding and
Searching of his Ship by Foreign Warships, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 157, 162-63 (2008) (noting
that Grotius developed the idea that the sea be open to all nations engaged in activities such
as maritime commerce).
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the early seventeenth century, when many European countries were not
committed to such an idea, directly related to advice solicited from him by
his client, the Dutch East India Company. 16 Grotius argued against
privatizing ownership of the seas because it was in the best interests of
Dutch trade in the East Indies. Rather than merely argue that only the
Dutch had a right to freedom of the seas, he defended the rights of the
Dutch on the premise that the seas belonged to mankind as a whole. For
Grotius, private ownership only applied to objects that had “definite
limits.” 17 Grotius argued that because the sea encompassed the globe and
bordered every land mass occupied by humankind, it was incapable of
private ownership. 18
Grotius advanced a medley of reasons for the existence of freedom of the
high seas—though some of his justifications were rather curious. For
example, he wrote that private ownership of the seas was not possible
because “when the lands were first divided[,] the sea was still for the
greater part unknown.” 19 It followed that such widely-separated races
could not have had any common agreement as to the division of the seas.20
Without any prior agreement, the Sea, in Grotius’s view, belonged to all
nations. 21
Closely related to Grotius’s ideas about the private ownership of
property and the common ownership of the seas by all nations was the right
of all mankind to engage in commerce. 22 According to Grotius, man had a
right to traverse the sea, as well as lands that were privately owned, for
legitimate reasons. 23 Trade and commerce with other nations were among
such legitimate reasons to traverse the seas.24 He argued that:
[T]he right to engage in commerce pertains equally to all peoples; and
16. See Martine Julia van Ittersum, Mare Liberum Versus the Propriety of the Seas?
The Debate Between Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and William Welwood (1552-1624) and its
Impact on Anglo-Scotto-Dutch Fishery Disputes in the Second Half of the Seventeenth
Century, 10 EDINBURGH L. REV. 239, 240 (2006) (explaining Grotius’s justification for
Dutch expansion was based on a desire to serve his country in any way he could); see also
Porras, supra note 15, at 764-66 (noting that Grotius advanced the “doctrine of the
providential function of commerce,” which depicted commercial pursuits as inherently good
for humanity and interferences with it as an affront to God’s design).
17. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 190-91.
18. Id. at 191.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE IURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS 218 (James Brown Scott
ed., Gladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1964) (1604)
(arguing that God distributed various talents and resources to various regions to foster
human interaction, including commerce). De Jure Praedae was written by Grotius between
1804 and 1608, but was never published during his life. Mare Liberum was published in
1609.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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jurisconsults of the greatest renown extend the application of this principle
to the point where they deny that any state or prince has the power to issue
a general prohibition forbidding others to enjoy access to or trade with the
subjects of that state or prince. This doctrine is the source of the sacrosanct
law of hospitality. 25
Grotius argued that permission must first be sought when traversing
privately held land or water. 26 If it was denied, the traveler still retained
the right to pass even if the passage required violence.27 According to
Grotius, this right to passage applied equally to goods in trade, and “[n]o
one, in fact, ha[d] the right to hinder any nation from carrying on
commerce with any other nation at a distance.” 28 Grotius rationalized that
the right of unhindered trade benefited all of mankind and “human
society.” 29 Navigation and commercial access to distant lands could not be
impeded without causing harm. 30 Thus, according to Grotius, the right to
engage in commerce in the high seas could be defended through war.31
In De Jure Praedae, or Commentary on The Law of Prize and Booty,
Grotius gave legal advice following the capture by an East India Company
vessel of a Portuguese trading vessel, the Santa Catarina, in the East Indies
during the very early part of the seventeenth century. 32 Grotius advanced
multiple arguments for the capture, including public and private war for
interfering with the freedom to traverse the seas and to engage in
commerce. 33 From the advice he gave regarding the Santa Catarina,
Grotius extrapolated rules of international law, not only on the freedom of
the seas but also on the law of war.
Grotius posited that there was no need to justify war against pirates
because it was not customary or necessary to declare war “against tyrants,
robbers, pirates, and all persons who do not form part of a foreign state.” 34
In fact, for Grotius, “no warning notification [was] necessary for war
25. Id. at 218-19.
26. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 198.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 199.
29. Id. at 199-200 (discussing the idea that trade is a necessary action for human beings
to engage in, because, as Libanius stated, “God did not bestow all products upon all parts of
the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might cultivate
a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another”).
30. Id. at 200.
31. Id. at 171, 179.
32. See GROTIUS, supra note 22, at 1-7 (arguing that the capture was permissible).
33. For a critical and insightful assessment, see Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius’
Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Revisiting Mare Liberum (1609) 20-26
(Institute for Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2005.14Borschberg.pdf; see also MARTINE JULIA
VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND
THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES, 1595-1615, at 21-30, 43-52 (2006)
(providing detailed historical context for Grotius’s legal conclusions and motivations).
34. GROTIUS, supra note 22, at 97.
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against persons who [were] already conducting themselves as enemies of
[the] state.” 35 Within this framework, Grotius justified the Dutch capture
of the valuable Portuguese vessel, the Santa Catarina. Despite the fact that
the capturing vessel was not a licensed privateer, Grotius nevertheless
justified its seizure as consistent with the Netherlands’s right to traverse the
seas unhindered. 36 For Grotius, these depredations were similar to those
caused by pirates:
[E]ven if [the Portuguese] were the owners of the regions sought by the
Dutch, [they] would nevertheless be inflicting an injury if they prevented
the Dutch from entering those regions and engaging in commerce therein.
How much more unjust, then, is the existing situation, in which persons
desirous of commerce with peoples who share that desire, are cut off from
the latter by the intervention of men who are not invested with power either
over the said peoples or over the route to be followed! For there is no
stronger reason underlying our abhorrence even of robbers and pirates than
the fact that they besiege and render unsafe the thoroughfares of human
intercourse. 37
Put simply, any state could punish pirates and robbers because their
interference with commerce harmed humanity as a whole.38
B. The Case of Somali Piracy
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has bedeviled shipping in the important
Gulf of Aden transit corridor since the 1990s, when the government of
Somalia collapsed and the country became embroiled in chaos.39 Although
nation-building and post-war reconstruction increasingly came into vogue
after the end of the Cold War,40 Somalia has not been favored with such

35. Id. at 101.
36. Id. at 1-7.
37. Id. at 219-20.
38. Id. at 326; see also ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 318 (2d ed. 1998)
(arguing that twentieth-century efforts by European powers to combat piracy “continued
British assertion, now shared with France, of a special authority to safeguard international
commerce based on the special interest, military strength and moral assertiveness of the
British alone.”) Further, Rubin notes that the support for universal jurisdiction to prosecute
pirates in these agreements reflected “a conception of special military or political rights to
impose order on the high seas in the interests of general commerce and to confine rebellion
to national borders of a single state, to the profit of third country merchants.” Id. at 319.
39. Somali Regions Vow to Oust Pirates from Enclaves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/13/world/international-us-somaliapiracy.html?scp=2&sq=somalia%20piracy%2090s&st=cse. See also JOHN DRYSDALE,
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SOMALIA?: A TALE OF TRAGIC BLUNDERS (1994) (arguing “When
Somali government institutions collapse and clan cohesion fragments there are no deterrents
to robbery, with or without violence,” id. 20).
40. See Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 903, 960 (1997) (noting that theories of modernization in the
post-colonial era “largely reflected the ideological hegemony of Western capitalism”).
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attention. 41 The United States precipitously withdrew from the country
following the downing of its black hawk helicopters in 1993,42 and the
United Nations mission in Somalia similarly faltered.43 Today, the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia is in dire need of support in
establishing control of the country—even of Mogadishu, the Somali
capital. At the United Nations, Somalia’s representative has stressed the
importance of international assistance in the Djibouti Peace Process and the
rebuilding of the country as a means of addressing the persistent piracy off
its coast. 44
Quantifying the economic ramifications of piracy off the coast of
Somalia is difficult. The International Maritime Organization notes that the
burden piracy places on global commerce is enormous. 45 Indeed, the cost
41. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Somalia: Amnesty International Calls
for Accountability and Safeguards on Arms Transfers to Somalia’s Transitional Federal
Government
(Aug.
11,
2009),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/006/2009/en/06ab18f3-984e-4a9f-9df29f0e93c5e14e/afr520062009en.pdf (claiming that the United States’ involvement in the
Djibouti Peace Process—the international effort to improve conditions in Somalia that
began with the October 2008 signing of the Djibouti Agreement—has been limited to U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s pledge of military support to the Somali Transitional
Federal Government and the provision of “40 tons of weapons and ammunition to
Somalia”); see also GERALD LEMELLE & MICHAEL STULMAN, AFRICA POLICY OUTLOOK
2009, at 2-3 (2009), http://www.africaaction.org/uploads/3/0/7/6/3076893/africaoutlook_final1.pdf (arguing that “U.S. involvement has directly undermined the cause of
peace and stability [in Somalia]” and that “long-lasting peace and stability can only be
reached when the root causes of poverty are addressed and a government responsive to the
needs of Somalis first is in place.”) Moreover, the United States’ only response to the
“overwhelming disaster” in Somalia has been with its military, which “is neither a
policymaker nor a humanitarian agency.” LEMELLE & STULMAN, supra, at 2–3; see also
Daud Ed Osman, Djibouti Peace Agreement: A Blueprint for a National Unity Government,
HIIRAAN
ONLINE,
Aug.
19,
2008,
http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2008/aug/djibouti_peace_agreement_a_blueprint_for_a_nation
al_unity_government.aspx (arguing that, at least until recently, the “‘international
community’ and their narrative of the Somali crisis, including their reluctance to accept the
incompetence of the [Somali Transitional Federal Government,]” has led to “the worst
humanitarian disaster in the world”). But see J. Peter Pham, Somaliland: What Somalia
Could
Be,
WORLD
DEFENSE
REVIEW,
July
16,
2009,
http://worlddefensereview.com/pham071609.shtml (“If the failure so far of no fewer than
fourteen internationally-sponsored attempts at establishing a national government indicates
anything, it is the futility of the notion that outsiders can impose a regime on Somalia.”).
42. U.S. Looks at Diplomatic Presence in Somalia, REUTERS, Feb. 1, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN0149690320070201.
43. See LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 4 (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997) (linking the failure of the UN
mission to its narrow mandate of “force protection”); JOHN DRYSDALE, WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO SOMALIA?: A TALE OF TRAGIC BLUNDERS (1994). (arguing that Somalia got
itself into ‘a horrible mess’ ‘partly due to UN inaction’ and because of “partisan UN policy
and practice, and the ill-advised pursuit of the doctrine of peace-enforcement,” id. at 2)
44. See Press Release, supra note 13 (describing the recent spate of piracy as connected
to the “nearly 20 years of instability” in Somalia).
45. See International Maritime Organization, Piracy in Waters Off the Coast of
Somalia, http://www.imo.org/dynamic/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1178 (last visited Apr. 4,
2010) (explaining that pirate attacks threaten the integrity of the Gulf of Aden, which
facilitates roughly eight percent of the world’s trade in goods and materials).
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of maritime insurance has risen sharply, 46 and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance through the Gulf of Aden has been adversely affected.47 The
reach of piracy’s impact on commerce stretches all the way from the Gulf
of Aden down to Southern Africa, as the alternative route between these
areas would require ships to navigate around West Africa—a much more
expensive and time-consuming prospect.
Some ship owners argue that the costs and aggravation caused by
piratical attacks are avoidable simply by complying with the pirates and
paying the ransom demanded. 48 Similarly, in response to the earlynineteenth-century Barbary pirate attacks, some argued there was wisdom
in paying the lesser fee of £250,000.00 to the pirates in order to save the
larger £1 million expense of providing military protection for European
commerce. 49 The U.S. President at the time, Thomas Jefferson, believed
however that waging war, killing the Barbary pirates, and destroying their
property was the best way to deter piratical attacks against American
merchant ships within the Mediterranean region.50
Jefferson also repudiated the practice of the Adams administration that
preceded him. The Adams administration purchased treaties of protection
with Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis to save American ships and crewmen from
capture and enslavement by the Barbary pirates. Jefferson, by contrast,
sought and received congressional authorization to have unlimited
discretion in dealing with the Barbary States in a law entitled, the “Act for
the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against
Tripolitan Cruisers.” 51 Rather than pay tributes in return for protection like
President Adams, Jefferson, under pressure to protect the honor of the

46. See Artwell Dlamini, Piracy Pushes Up Maritime Insurance Costs, BUSINESS DAY
(Johannesburg), Nov. 19, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200811190613.html (noting that
“insurance costs were rising to the point where some ship owners refused to sail their
vessels in pirate-infested waters, especially around the Horn of Africa”).
47. Mark Mazzetti and Sharon Otterman, U.S. Capitan Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy
Ship Arrives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at A6 (discussing the Alabama Attack).
48. See Rev. J. Loring Carpenter, The Tough Lessons Piracy Teaches, DAILY NEWS
(Newburyport,
MA),
July
11,
2009,
available
at
http://www.newburyportnews.com/punews/local_story_191221617.html/ (explaining that
ship owners regularly pay the requested ransom of pirates because doing so protects human
life and allows for the cargo to continue to its destination); Larry King Live: American
Captain Held Hostage by Pirates; Interview with Dr. Laura Schlessinger (CNN television
broadcast
Apr.
8,
2009),
available
at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0904/08/lkl.01.html (“[T]he shipping companies
pay the ransom because it’s the easiest and cheapest way out. They get their crew back and
they also get their ships back.”).
49. Robert F. Turner, State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The Legacy of
Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 125 (2003).
50. See id. (suggesting that concerns of dignity and respect also informed Jefferson’s
aggressive approach toward pirates).
51. David A. Carson, Jefferson, Congress, and the Question of Leadership in the
Tripolitan War, 94 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 409, 415 (1986).
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young nation against the pirates, ultimately prevailed in a military victory
over the Barbary pirates. The United States agreed to a peace treaty with
the pirates in which no tribute was paid. 52 Historians have argued that
since the Barbary wars, it has become clear that “the only effective
argument with a buccaneer [is] force.” 53
Piracy today, as in the nineteenth century, continues to be hugely
profitable to pirates. Piracy involves externalizing costs while internalizing
huge pay-offs when a ransom is paid for releasing a ship held as
collateral. 54 The more-organized Somali pirates are financed by rich
investors outside Somalia who reap the benefits of their investment without
having to take any risks themselves. 55 These pirates must succeed in
getting a ransom payment periodically to make it a lucrative business for
the financiers. 56 Thus, combating piracy to protect legitimate commerce on
the high seas often involves attempts to control the lucrative ransom
extraction business.
Unlike the early-seventeenth-century Dutch or early-nineteenth-century
American war efforts to combat piracy, combating piracy in the early
twenty-first century poses challenges of a different magnitude. In the early
nineteenth century, the American navy was in its infancy. Two centuries
later, the American military has unprecedented capabilities, including both
52. Turner, supra note 49, at 136.
53. Louis B. Wright & Julia H. Macleod, First American Campaign in North Africa, 7
HUNTINGTON LIB. Q. 281, 281 (1944). These two historians maintain that “[i]n the end, the
United States set an example to the other maritime nations by exacting at the point of
cannon a lasting peace from the corsairs.” Id. at 281-82. Of the ultimate American victory
at Derna, they argue that it was “the most favorable peace that an Occidental nation had yet
exacted from a Barbary power. That peace paved the way for the complete cessation of
corsair depredations on American commerce.” Id. at 305.
54. Cf. Turner, supra note 49, at 132-33 (discussing the similar economic incentives
motivating tyrants to go to war).
55. See Nick Wadhams, Somali Pirates Take the Money and Run to Kenya (National
Public
Radio
broadcast
May
7,
2010),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126510891 (reporting that “pirates
say operations are now run by warlords and financiers around the world. The men who do
the dirty work get only a tiny piece of those multi-million dollar ransoms”). On April 13,
2010, President Obama signed an Executive Order declaring that piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia was a threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia
and prohibited the contributions of funds, goods and services in connection thereto. See
Exec. Order Concerning Somalia, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Conflict in Somalia, Apr. 13, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/executive-order-concerning-somalia.
56. Marketplace: More to Piracy than “Maritime Mugging” (American Public Media
radio
broadcast
May
21,
2009),
available
at
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/05/21/pm_invisible_hook_q/
(providing Peter T. Leeson’s views on the differences between eighteenth-century and
modern pirates and how pirates are financed). See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK:
THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES 204 (2009) (“Modern day pirates tend to sail in very
small groups and don’t live, sleep, and interact together on their ships for months, weeks, or
even days on end, they don’t constitute a society and consequently face few, if any, of the
problems of their forefathers.”).
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manned and unmanned airpower to support its land and sea operations. 57
In responding to the threat posed by Somali piracy, whether the use of
force is necessary at all and, if it is, what response is proportional and
appropriate remain open questions. In addition, the use of force against
pirates raises human rights issues, particularly given the allegations of
torture upon capture and detention in Kenya. 58 I address these issues in
Part II below.
The use of force against piracy safeguards the freedom of commerce on
the high seas. 59 Hugo Grotius claimed such use of force in favor of Dutch
commerce in the East Indies in the early seventeenth century. 60 Thomas
Jefferson claimed it for the fledgling United States against the Barbary
pirates in the early twentieth century. 61 Today it is claimed ostensibly for
global commerce—mostly ships coming from Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere to Africa—against Somali pirates. The use of force against
Somali pirates remains a central response despite a combination of other
measures being deployed, such as increased prosecutions. 62
In this era of almost unlimited war-making potential, safeguards against
its abuse under international law are vital. Protecting freedom of
commerce should not become the latest occasion to jettison international
law’s limits on the use of force and to expand the permissible scope of
force as envisaged under the United Nations Charter system. In addition,
protecting freedom of commerce through the use of force should not shift
international attention away from the reconstruction of Somalia. Further,
the prevention of illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste off
Somali’s coast is necessary in order to fully address the escalation of piracy
in the region. 63
57. Thomas W. Smith, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural
Violence, 46 INT’L STUD. Q. 255 (2002).
58. See MILITARY EXPENDITURE: SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2008), appx. 5A (noting that the United Stated had 41.5%
of the word’s share of military expenditures in 2008).
59. See generally JAMES GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010)
(discussing in greater detail the relationship between war and commerce).
60. See supra Part I.A.
61. Turner, supra note 47, at 125 (explaining that in Jefferson believed “justice and
honor” called for military action against pirates).
62. See S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (encouraging the
formation of the international cooperation mechanism that later became the Contact Group
on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia); see also Press Release, Department of State, Contact
Group
on
Piracy
Off
the
Coast
of
Somalia
(Jan.
14,
2009),
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/121054.htm (explaining that the Contact Group was
designed to focus on initiatives such as military and operational conduct, information
sharing and capacity building, judicial issues, commercial industry coordination, and public
information).
63. See Dutch Free Yemeni Captives from Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A10
(reporting that Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, the president of the self-governing state of
Puntland within Somalia, said that “‘the root cause of this piracy, as everyone knows, is
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II. PROSECUTING PIRATES AS OUTLAWS
This section examines the prosecution of Somali pirates in Kenyan
courts by comparing the guaranteed rights of criminal defendants under
Kenyan and international law. The prosecutions in Kenya raise two
concerns. First, Somali nationals are charged in Kenyan courts as nonnationals captured on the high seas and therefore have extremely tenuous
links to Kenya. The added caseload strains an already-burdened criminal
justice system and thus presents a challenge for Kenya to ensure the
fairness and propriety of these trials. Kenya’s role in safeguarding freedom
of commerce, a role many other countries can share equally, is extremely
problematic, and its self-interest in attracting foreign aid should not trump
its duty to ensure fair trials. 64
A second concern is that while Kenya has become the international
piracy court, Article 105 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) gives primary jurisdiction to the states that capture
these pirates. 65 As such, no established legal framework governs the arrest
and detention of suspected pirates prior to being handed over to Kenya for
prosecution. The transfer of suspected pirates to Kenya is currently
illegal fishing . . . . That situation still exists, so any activity directed at eliminating piracy
should also be combined with the elimination of illegal fishing by foreign trawlers’.”); see
also Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia’s Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2008, at A1 (reporting that fishermen in the Gulf of Aden believe that the illegal
dumping of “barrels of toxic waste . . . and rogue fishing trawlers [that] suck[] up not just
fish and lobsters but also the coral and the plants that sustain them . . . [may have] turned
[Somali] fishermen into pirates”); Mohamed Abshir Waldo, The Two Piracies in Somalia:
Why the World Ignores the Other?, WARDHEER NEWS (Somalia), Jan. 8, 2009,
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html
(discussing the link between illegal fishing in Somalia’s waters and the proliferation of
piracy off its coast); Press Release, Security Council, Chairs of Security Council Subsidiary
Bodies Brief Members As Two-Year Tenures Approach Conclusion, U.N. Doc. SC/9537
(Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9537.doc.htm (“[P]irates
invoked legitimate Somalia grievances about illegal fishing in Somali waters by foreign
ships and the illegal dumping of toxic waste off the coast. Those grievances had earned the
pirates general support among Somali society.”). But see J. Peter Pham, Pondering Somali
Piracy,
WORLD
DEFENSE
REVIEW,
Apr.
23,
2009,
http://worlddefensereview.com/pham042309.shtml (insisting that the notion “that the
[Somalian pirates are] modern-day Robin Hoods defending Somali waters from reported
incidents of illegal commercial fishing and toxic waste disposal” is completely wrong).
64. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 269-70
(1991) (arguing that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a state with no territorial or
nationality links “should require” such a state to fully meet the “criteria of a fair trial and the
limits of punitive action that are part of basic human rights.”); see also Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 840 (1988)
(contending that states employing universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes must pay
particular attention to the defendant’s rights because “[e]xercising universal jurisdiction may
present special problems that bear on the fairness and propriety of the judicial proceedings
in a State removed from the site of the crime and having no link of nationality to the
accused”).
65. James Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured By Third
States Under Kenyan and International Law, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010).
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governed by bilateral agreements with the capturing states, while
prosecutions are being conducted under Kenyan law. Thus, the rules
governing the apprehension, treatment, and detention of piracy suspects
prior to being transferred to Kenya is largely unsettled. The United Nations
Office on Drugs and crime (UNODC), with assistance from the European
Union, has drafted guidelines for countries transferring piracy suspects to
Kenya. 66 Unfortunately, these guidelines do not resolve a number of
important questions, such as the length of time piracy suspects may be
legally detained before being handed over to Kenya for prosecution. Nor
do the guidelines address the legality of interrogation procedures and
techniques conducted by foreign militaries, the results of which are
forwarded to civilian authorities as evidence in piracy trials.
A. Legal Guarantees for Criminal Defendants Under Kenyan Law
While the legal basis surrounding the arrest and transfer of suspected
pirates is ambiguous, prosecutions are conducted within established
Kenyan law. 67 The rights of criminal defendants in Kenya are, on paper,
analogous to those guaranteed under international law. 68 These include the
right to a fair trial within a reasonable time by an impartial tribunal; 69 the
presumption of innocence; 70 the right to be informed of the charges in a
language the accused understands; 71 the right to have adequate time and
facilities to prepare a defense; 72 the right to defend oneself or to have legal
representation of one’s choice; 73 the right to cross-examine witnesses; 74 the
right to an interpreter; 75 and the right not to give incriminating evidence
66. These guidelines have been accepted by the European Union. See Posting of Sarah
Mielke to Summer Associate Blog, http://law.wlu.edu/blog/ (July 15, 2009, 14:27 EST)
(explaining that these guidelines were drafted collectively by EU legal counsel and Kenyan
prosecutors).
67. See Gathii, supra note 60 (questioning the jurisdictional basis for trying piracy
suspects before the magistrate’s court rather than the High Court of Kenya).
68. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 9-11, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175-76 [hereinafter ICCPR] (detailing certain rights of criminal
defendants in states that are parties to the convention); African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 247 [hereinafter Banjul Charter]
(agreeing to provide specific legal rights to citizens of states that are members of the
Organization of African Unity). Kenya ratified the ICCPR on May 1, 1972. ICCPR, supra,
at 172 n.1. The Banjul Charter entered into force on October 21, 1986. Banjul Charter,
supra, at 245 n.1.
69. CONSTITUTION, Art. 77(1) (2008) (Kenya).
70. Id. Art. 77(2)(a).
71. Id. Art. 77(2)(b).
72. Id. Art. 77(2)(c).
73. Id. Art. 77(2)(d). However, there is no right to legal representation for indigent
defendants unless they are charged with offenses such as murder or violent robbery, which
are punishable by death. See id. Art. 77(14) (“Nothing contained in subsection (2)(d) shall
be construed as entitling a person to legal representation at public expense.”).
74. Id. Art. 77(2)(e).
75. Id. Art. 77(2)(d).
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against oneself. 76 The Kenyan Constitution also prohibits torture and
inhumane or degrading treatment. 77
Suspected pirates on trial in Kenya are held in the now much-reformed
Shimo La Tewa prison in Mombasa, with funding from the EU-UNODC
program in Nairobi. 78 When Kenyan Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka
visited the prison toward the end of last year, piracy suspects complained
that their trial were taking too long. 79 A French nongovernmental
organization, Lawyers of the World, has begun pressing the EU to take
action, citing violations of the pirates’ rights as guaranteed in the EU’s
agreement with Kenya. 80 Lawyers of the World have sought audience in
one of the piracy cases to represent the suspected pirates.81 If Lawyers of
the World is allowed an audience in a Kenyan court, the rights specified in
the EU-Kenyan Agreement are likely to be invoked and their status as
binding authority will be tested. If this occurs, the rights guaranteed under
the agreement will finally play a part in the Kenyan judicial system. To
date, these rights have only been invoked in the diplomatic realm.
B. Arrest, Handover to Kenya, or Release: How Kenya Became the
International Piracy Court
While the aforesaid EU-Kenya Memorandum of Understanding provides
the legal basis for Kenya to prosecute piracy suspects captured by EU-led
forces, the general framework justifying the arrest, detention, and handover
of piracy suspects for prosecution in Kenya remains very unclear.
According to one person involved in the drafting of this framework:
The legal foundation is still a bit murky, but the idea is that suspects are
arrested and detained at sea based on universal jurisdiction, transferred
based on bilateral agreements, and prosecuted under Kenyan domestic

76. Id. Art. 77(7).
77. Id. Art. 74(1).
78. Before the EU-UNODC funding, this prison was notorious for crowding and
unsanitary conditions in the humid and sweltering heat of Mombasa.
79. Antony Kitimo, Kenya: Piracy Suspects Appeal to VP Kalonzo, DAILY NATION
(Nairobi),
Sept.
4,
2009,
available
at
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200909040838.html (reporting that since Kenya
began its prosecutions in 2006, “only ten out of 110 suspected pirates have been tried and
sentence[d]”).
80. Sarah McGregor, EU, Kenya Somali-Pirate Treaty “Violates Rights,” Lawyers Say,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Aug.
19,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDs_bA4DXiTg; see Otto
Bakano, Piracy Trials in Kenya Beset by Legal Obstacles, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London),
Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7398594/Piracytrials-in-Kenya-beset-by-legal-obstacles.html (noting concerns with possible corruption and
lack of due process in Kenyan courts).
81. Sarah McGregor, Aid Group to Defend Piracy Suspects, Ensure Fair Trials,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
Aug.
3,
2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5wQ7mzHZEEY.
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The notion that universal jurisdiction justifies the detention of suspects
for long periods of time, such as those in the piracy cases identified above,
is particularly flawed. The entire purpose of universal jurisdiction is to
arrest suspects and charge them with the offense for which they have been
arrested rather than to detain them. Universal jurisdiction as defined in
Article 105 of UNCLOS certainly gives capturing states the authority to
arrest piracy suspects but it is another matter entirely to argue that universal
jurisdiction also allows military detention. 83 No justification exists for the
argument of Kenyan courts’ that time starts running once the suspects are
handed over to Kenyan authorities and not upon their arrest.
Before Kenya started accepting piracy suspects for prosecution, many
piracy suspects were released in what became known as a “catch and
The vagueness surrounding indefinite detentions
release” policy. 84
contributed directly to this practice. No arguments were advanced to
justify indefinite detentions—as have been used in the terrorism context—
and before Kenya offered to prosecute piracy suspects, many governments
patrolling the coast of Somalia simply instructed their forces to release
them. 85 In addition, the capturing states feared that pirates would seek
asylum should prosecutions be unsuccessful or after they had served their
sentences. 86
In the ongoing Spanish trial of two Somali pirates referenced above, the
court dropped charges against the pirates that would have entitled them to
82. Mielke, supra note 66.
83. See UNCLOS, supra note 130 at 397 (UNCLOS provides that “every State” may
arrest people found on board a vessel that is either used by pirates or that has been taken
over by pirates, then, the courts of the capturing State “may decide upon the penalties to be
imposed”).
84. For an analysis, see generally Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantanamo at Sea”: The
Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010); Mohamed
Ahmed, NATO Frees Pirate Hostages, Belgian Ship Seized, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2009,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLI170695. For an argument against catch and release, and
for a vigilant antipiracy military policy, see Ruth Wedgwood, What Do You Do With a
Captured
Pirate?,
DEFINING
IDEAS,
2009,
available
at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas/63130762.html.
85. Kontorovich, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
86. See Somali Pirates to Request Asylum in Netherlands, EARTHTIMES, May 18, 2009,
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/269283,somali-pirates-to-request-asylum-innetherlands.html (noting that five suspected Somali pirates standing trial in the Netherlands
announced their plans to seek asylum there); Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace
Capture as Route to Europe, TELEGRAPH (United Kingdom), May 19, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5350183/Somali-pirates-embracecapture-as-route-to-Europe.html (noting that some Somali pirates might allow themselves to
be captured in order to take advantage of European asylum laws); Marie Woolf, Pirates Can
Claim UK Asylum, SUNDAY TIMES (London) at 1, Apr. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article3736239.ece (noting that the British
Foreign Office advised the Royal Navy that pirates should not be detained or sent back to
Somalia because doing so could subject them to beheading and murder, and bringing pirates
to the UK could entitle them to asylum).
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be considered for asylum upon being released.87 These countries also
worried that piracy suspects would claim they were peaceful fishermen,
which would create evidentiary problems that could threaten successful
prosecutions. 88 Naval officers off the coast of Somalia continue to release
Somali nationals captured on the high seas if they were interdicted and
arrested in a skiff near a pirate mother ship but not engaged in a piratical
attack at the time. This is because Kenyan law does not provide for
prosecutions of those who might be engaged in a conspiracy to commit
piracy. 89 As one British Rear Admiral has put it:
The issue is that when I detain a mother ship in the middle of the ocean
how do I get those pirates into a court of law? My aircraft has flown
over it, I’ve seen skiffs, fuel, ladders, 15 pirates and no fishing gear, so
it’s not out there for a Sunday afternoon sail [but] they haven’t
90
committed an act of piracy.

This demonstrates the importance of objections raised by defense
lawyers in the piracy prosecutions in Kenya with regard to video-taped
evidence or with a view to establishing where exactly the offenses were
committed. These evidentiary issues are developed more fully below.91
The EU-Kenya Memorandum of Understanding under which Kenya
accepted jurisdiction over suspected Somali pirates was quickly negotiated
87. See Woolls, supra note 137 (describing how hijackers held a Spanish fishing vessel
hostage and demanded the release of their two “colleagues” held in custody in Madrid).
88. Matthias Gebauer & Holger Stark, Policing the Gulf of Aden: Somali Pirate Trial
Tests
Limits
of
EU
Mission,
SPIEGEL
ONLINE,
Apr.
1,
2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,616760,00.html; see also Otto Bakano,
Piracy Trials in Kenya Beset by Legal Obstacles, TELEGRAPH (United Kingdom), Mar. 8,
2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7398594/Piracy-trials-in-Kenya-besetby-legal-obstacles.html (noting, for instance, the inadmissibility of U.S. officers’ statements
in Kenyan court).
89. See Tristan McConnell, Kenyan Courts on Legal Front Line in Battle to Stop
Somali
Pirates,
TIMES
ONLINE,
Dec.
10,
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6950951.ece
(noting
the
difficulty of proving conspiracy to commit piracy and explaining that a conviction is usually
only possible if the suspects are caught while actually engaged in the act of piracy).
90. Id. This position of adding conspiracy to be part of the crime of piracy was
advocated for by a senior governmental official. See Andrew Shapiro, Keynote Address at
the American University Law Review Symposium: Counter-Piracy Policy: Delivering
Judicial
Consequences
(Mar.
31,
2009),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/139326.htm (arguing one way of meeting contemporary
piracy challenges is to “to infer the intent to commit an act of piracy from the possession of
piracy-related equipment and the circumstances in which the suspects are encountered”).
See also, Eugene Kontorovich, Equipment Articles for the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy,
A Discussion Paper of the One Earth Future, Oceans Beyond Piracy Project, 17 May, 2010
available
at
http://www.oneearthfuture.org/images/imagefiles/EQUIPMENT%20ARTICLES%20FOR%
20THE%20PROSECUTION%20OF%20MARITIME%20PIRACY.pdf (also arguing in
favor of expanding the definition of piracy to make it a prosecutable offense to have
equipment that can be used in a piratical attack using the analogy of equipment articles in
the anti-slavery context)
91. See infra Part III.
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by the German Ambassador to Kenya after a German warship, the
Rheinland-Pfalz, captured nine Somali piracy suspects and held them for
three days without instructions on how to proceed. 92 During a twelve-day
detention period, while the fate of the pirates was publicly and
acrimoniously debated in Germany, a deal was procured under which they
were handed over to Kenya. 93 During this period, a state prosecutor in
Hamburg, Germany had announced it would prosecute the pirates. 94
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats and Frank-Walter
Steinmeier’s Social Democrats disagreed on how to handle an attack on a
“ship owned by a German company but registered under a foreign flag and
manned by a non-German crew.” 95 A Frankfurt lawyer, Oliver Wallasch,
summarized the stakes in the disagreement:
This was not a judicial decision about where to try them. It was purely
political . . . . Elections [were] coming up in Germany . . . . The average
German [would not] understand why Somalis captured in international
96
waters should be tried at German taxpayers’ expense . . . .

The EU-Kenya Memorandum of Understanding negotiated by the
German Ambassador to Kenya with the Kenyan government was therefore
a perfect solution to the lack of political will in the capturing states to
assume the responsibility of prosecuting the piracy suspects. In large part,
capturing states are hesitant to assume the responsibility because of the
procedural and substantive rights criminal defendants are entitled to in the
United States and in Europe. 97 Kenya offers many advantages. For
example, prosecutions in the United States must overcome challenges
relating to the taking of evidence, handling of exhibits, and holding of
suspects in appropriate conditions until they can be handed over for
prosecution. 98 In addition, unlike the populations in the countries of
capturing states, which have little political will to support the cost of piracy
prosecutions in their own countries, prosecutions in Kenya were not until

92. Horand Knaup & Alexander Szandar, Berlin Spared Embarrassment by Kenya Deal
on
Pirates,
SPIEGEL
ONLINE,
Mar.
9,
2009,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,612168,00.html.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Diana Fong, Politics Influences the Jurisdiction for Somali Pirate Trials, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Germany), Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4198300,00.html.
97. See McConnell, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (referring to the
proceedings in Kenya as “sluggish”). For an extensive overview of due process protections
in a variety of jurisdictions, see generally ROZA PATI, DUE PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS (2009). For a discussion of the
shortcomings of Kenya’s old evidence rules in piracy trials, see Michael Bahar, Attaining
Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy
Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 82–85 (2007).
98. See infra Part III.
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recently publicly debated either in Parliament or elsewhere.99 The Kenyan
government saw the prospect of receiving funding for its archaic criminal
justice system and embraced the opportunity. However, when Parliament
began questioning the government’s decision to prosecute the piracy trials,
the government announced that it was no longer going to accept piracy
suspects. 100
With an eye toward presenting cases for trial in Kenya, the UNODC has
crafted handover guidance procedures for the militaries patrolling the
waters off the coast of Somalia. 101 The procedures instruct the foreign
navies on what evidence to gather and how to prepare it, with a view to
supporting their prosecution, not in accordance with the requirements of
their own countries, but rather with regard to Kenya (and now the
Seychelles). 102 These handover guidance procedures are confidential.103
Although the UNODC seems to proceed on the assumption that the
arrest and detention of the piracy suspects is based on universal
jurisdiction, the navies patrolling the waters off the coast of Somalia are
clearly exercising powers akin to those exercised in war. 104 When the
suspects are brought to Kenya, however, they are treated as ordinary
criminals. 105 As a result, there is great variance between what Kenyan law
anticipates to be the proper mode of arrest and search and the procedures
actually deployed on the high seas in undertaking the arrests. The arrest
and detention of pirates on the high seas conflicts with the rules governing
99. See Kenya Ends Somali Pirates’ Trials, BBC, Apr. 1, 2010, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8599347.stm.
For example, a member of Kenya’s
Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Foreign Relations stated that the failure to deliver
promised funds for constructing the water and sewage system and painting the Shimo la
Tewa prison where the piracy suspects are held was a reason to withdraw from the
prosecution agreements.
100. Somali Piracy Cases Stall over AG Remarks, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Apr. 6,
2010, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/893802/-/vsele4/-/index.html; see
also AG Queried over Country’s Role on Piracy Cases, DAILY NATION (Kenya), Mar. 30,
2010, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201003300855.html.
101. E-mail from Alan Cole, EU/UNODC Counter-Piracy Programme Coordinator,
UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa, to Robert Emery, Reference Librarian, Albany
Law School (Mar. 5, 2010, 04:23 EAT) (on file with author).
102. Id. A recent security council resolution has authorized an examination of the
establishment of an international piracy court. See S.C. Res. 1918, ¶4 (Apr. 27, 2010).
Seychelles is already in the process of establishing UN-backed piracy courts. See Seychelles
to Set up Courts to Fight Piracy:
UN, AFP, May 5, 2010, available at
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/100505/world/somalia_piracy_shipping_un_seychelles?prin
ter=1.
103. Id.
104. For a good analysis of pirate activities rising to a level of gravity that may have
triggered a right of self defense among states, see Michael Davey, A Pirate Looks At the
Twenty-First Century: The Legal Status of Somali Pirates in an Age of Sovereign Seas and
Human Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1197, 1218–1224 (2010). UN Security Council
resolutions, however, remain the best legal justification for the use of force.
105. See infra Part III.A (discussing procedural issues and witness attendance issues in
piracy trials).
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arrest and detention of suspects prior to being formally charged in Kenyan
courts, notwithstanding the confidential UNODC crafted handover
guidance procedures. 106 The fact that UNODC is crafting procedures
regarding how evidence should be prepared for prosecutions in Kenya,
while neither the Kenyan Evidence Act 107 nor any other Kenyan law
addresses this issue, strongly suggests that the Kenyan Parliament’s role is
being usurped by an international organization. Circumventing the Kenyan
government constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of the country’s lawmaking power to an international organization.
C. The Legality of Piracy Arrests and Extended Pre-Trial Detentions
Kenyan law requires that suspects be charged before a court of law
within twenty-four hours of their arrest. 108 Thus, the extended detentions
of piracy suspects without a formal charge violates both section 72(3)(b) of
the Kenyan Constitution and section 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
In Republic v. Said Abdallah Haji & 8 Others, 109 for example, the piracy
suspects made exactly this argument in an application for dismissal of their
case. The suspects argued that they were not properly before the court
since they had been held for more than twenty-four hours before being
charged in court. The suspects were interdicted in the Gulf of Aden on
May 22, 2009 and were handed over to Kenyan authorities on June 25,
2009. 110 Thirty-three days passed before they were eventually surrendered
to Kenyan authorities, and thirty-four days before they were finally charged
in court.
The court rejected the argument, holding that the twenty-four-hour
106. See infra Part III.B (discussing Kenyan arrest procedures).
107. Evidence Act, (2009) Cap. 80 (Kenya).
108. CONSTITUTION, Art. 72(3)(b) (2008) (Kenya). This section provides:
A Person who is arrested or detained . . . upon reasonable suspicion of his having
committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence, and who is not released,
shall be brought before a court as soon as is reasonably practicable, and where he is
not brought before a court within twenty-four hours of his arrest or from the
commencement of his detention . . . the burden of proving that the person arrested
or detained has been brought before a court as soon as is reasonably practicable
shall rest upon any person alleging that the provisions of this subsection have been
complied with.
Id.; see also Criminal Procedure Code, (2009) Cap. 75 § 36 (Kenya) (reiterating the same).
109. (2009) Crim. Case No. 2127 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
are charged with piracy in relation to the Maria K vessel. The attack occurred on May 22,
2009, and the pirates were apprehended by the Italian warship Maestrale. See CIVIL
MARITIME ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT, U.S. OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, WORLDWIDE
THREAT TO SHIPPING; MARINER WARNING INFORMATION
¶
8
(2009),
http://www.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/MISC/wwtts/wwtts_20090610100000.txt
(explaining that the pirates were turned over to Kenyan officials on June 25, 2009 and that
charges were proffered the next day).
110. CIVIL MARITIME ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT, supra note 109.
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period started upon the suspects being handed over to Kenyan authorities
for prosecution rather than the time of interdiction and arrest on the high
seas. The court conveniently declined to squarely address the legality of
the thirty-three-day detention of the suspects prior to being brought to
Kenya. The court declined to respond to the defense’s argument that the
delay in charging the suspects could affect their right to receive a fair trial.
Delays in bringing suspects before Kenyan courts is not uncommon,
although thirty-three days is excessive. In Chacha Mwita & 4 Others v.
Commissioner of Police, 111 the High Court of Kenya found that three
suspects who had been held by the police for twenty-four hours without
being charged were entitled to “anticipatory bail,” or bail pending charges
against them, to avoid the abridgement of their fundamental rights and
freedoms under the Kenyan Constitution. 112 More to the point, in Ann
Njogu & 5 Others v. Republic, 113 the High Court held that a one-day delay
in bringing suspects before the court automatically voided any charges that
might have been brought against the suspects, however meritorious the
prosecution evidence. The High Court ordered the accused set free without
the threat of re-arrest on the basis of the initial evidence.
The cases involving piracy suspects are analogous to Albanus Mwasia
Mutua v. Republic, 114 where the accused was held without charge for eight
months. The Kenyan Court of Appeal held that section 73(3)(b) of the
Constitution, as read with section 77(1), entitles an accused person to a fair
hearing within a reasonable time. If this requirement is not met, the
accused must be released. 115 In Republic v. Amos Karuga Karatu, 116 an
investigating officer conceded that he held a suspect for six months before
eventually bringing charges. The High Court held that:
A period of 6 months delay cannot be explained away on the basis that
the investigating officer’s hands were tied and could do nothing due to
the procedure of processing the investigations file in their systems. The
constitutional and fundamental rights of an accused person cannot be
117
sacrificed at the alter of the so called police procedures.

In this context, the rejection of an analogous argument on behalf of the
111. (2006) Misc. Applic. No. 110 (H.C.K.)(Kenya).
112. Id.
113. (2007) Misc. Applic. No. 551 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
114. (2006) Crim. App. No. 120 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). See Paul Mwangi Murungu v.
Republic, (2006) Crim. App. No. 35 (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (citing the court’s decision in
Albanus Mwasia Mutua to find that an unexplained delay of ten days before a suspect was
brought to court justified his release); Gerald Macharia Githuku v. Republic, (2004) Crim.
App. No. 119 (C.A.K.) (Nairobi, Kenya) (quoting the High Court of Kenya’s opinion from
Albanus Mwasia Mutua).
115. See Republic v. Amos Karuga Karatu, (2006) Crim. App. No. 12 (H.C.K.) (Kenya)
(citing the High Court of Kenya’s holding in Albanus Mwasia Mutua verbatim).
116. (2006) Crim. App. No. 12 (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
117. Id.
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piracy suspects in Republic v. Said Abdullahi Haji & 8 Others is
inconsistent with section 72(3)(b) of the Constitution. The only basis on
which the result in Said Abdullahi Haji could be justified is that the
protections of section 72(3)(b) do not extend extraterritorially because the
suspects were allegedly arrested on the high seas. The court did not
however address itself to that question. By declining to seriously inquire
about the delay in charging the accused persons beyond twenty-four hours,
the court, in essence, legitimized the indefinite detention of the piracy
suspects before they were charged in Kenya.
Although Kenyan courts have declined to answer this question, the
arrests and detentions of the piracy suspects by foreign militaries on the
high seas are certainly governed by international law. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Kenya is a party,
requires that arrested individuals be promptly informed of the reasons for
the arrest and any criminal charges against them. 118 Such persons must be
brought before a judge or other authorized judicial officer 119 and given the
right to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest and detention.120
Delays in charging the piracy suspects occurred in each of the ongoing
cases in Mombasa. The following cases exemplify the variation in the
number of days between arrest on the high seas and charges being brought
against the accused persons: Republic v. Mohammed Hassan Ali 121
(eleven-day delay); Republic v. Liban Ahmed Ali & 10 Others 122 (sevenday delay); Republic v. Said Mohamed Ahmed & 7 Others123 (fifteen-day
118. ICCPR, supra note 68, at 175.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 176.
121. (2009) Crim. Case No. 1694 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
were arrested on May 7, 2009 by the Spanish Navy for committing piracy in relation to the
Maltese vessel Anny Petrakis. Spanish Navy Detains Suspected Pirates Off Somalia, AFP,
May
7,
2009,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i91FV8h3nCW2QuWAU4Vg2UT
ZLLTA. The case was first brought to court on May 18, 2009, the accused having been
turned over to Kenyan authorities on May 16, 2009. This case is due to be consolidated
with Republic v. Iadid Mohamed Mohamud, (2009) Crim. Case No. 1784 (Chief Magis. Ct.)
(Mombasa, Kenya), as ordered by the Chief Magistrates Court on August 24, 2009.
122. (2009) Crim. Case No. 1374 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
were arrested by the French Navy on April 15, 2009 after hijacking the Liberian Safmarine
Asia. Sharon Otterman & Mark McDonald, French Navy Seizes 11 Accused of Pirate
Attacks off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A8. They were turned over to Kenyan
officials on April 22, 2009 and were charged the next day. Katharine Houreld, Pirates Are
Marched Down Gangplank—to Kenya Jail, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2009Apr22/0,4670,Piracy,00.html.
123. (2008) Crim. Case No. 3486 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
were arrested on November 9, 2008 by the Royal British Marines from the HMS
Cumberland after attacking and detaining the Yemeni Waadi Omar 2 and the Danish
Powerful. Asha Hamisi, Suspected Pirates Appear in Court, KENYA BROAD. CORP., Nov. 19,
2008, http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?ID=53954. They were turned over to Kenyan
officials on November 18, 2008 and were charged on November 24, 2009. Said Mohamed
Ahmed, Crim. Case No. 3486.
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delay); Republic v. Jama Abdikadir Farah & 6 Others 124 (ten-day delay);
Republic v. Ahmed Abdikadir Hersi & 10 Others 125 (eight-day delay);
Republic v. Shafili Hirsi Ahmed & 6 Others 126 (fourteen-day delay), and
Republic v. Mohamud Mohamed Hashi & 8 Others 127 (seven-day delay).
In Said Mohamed Ahmed, the suspects were handed over to Kenya on
November 18, 2009 but were not charged until November 24, 2009. This
delay is inconsistent with the Kenyan High Court’s holding that bringing
charges more than twenty-four hours after arrest violates section 72(3)(b)
124.(2009) Crim. Case No. 1695 (Chief Magis. Ct.)

(Mombasa, Kenya). The accused were captured on May 7,
2009 by the Spanish Navy for the attempted hijacking of
the Panamanian Nepheli. Spanish Navy Detains Suspected
Pirates Off Somalia, supra note 121. Their boat
allegedly capsized due to evasive action taken by the
Nepheli, and they were pulled out of the water by the
crew of the Marqyes de la Ensenada, a ship that went to
investigate the Nepheli’s distress signal. Id. The
accused in this case were put on their defense at the
close of the prosecution case on 27th of May, 2010, see
Linah Benyawa, “Kenya Puts On Defense Piracy Suspects,”
East African Standard, May 27, 2010 available at
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=20000103
22&cid=418&story=Kenya%20puts%20on%20defence%20suspected%
20pirates
125. (2009) Crim. Case No. 1582 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
were seized by the French Navy on May 3, 2009 when they apparently mistook the French
military vessel FNS Nivose for a commercial vessel and “made a run at it.” Pirates Seized
After
Threatening
French
Navy
Ship,
CNN.COM,
May
3,
2009,
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/03/kenya.pirates/. They were then trapped
by a helicopter before they could fire or flee. Id. The pirates were handed over to Kenya on
8th May, 2009. See Mc Parry, “French Navy Hands Suspected Pirates to Kenya,” available
at http://www.armybase.us/2009/05/french-navy-hands-suspected-pirates-to-kenya/ .
126. (2009) Crim. Case No. 2463 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya) (initially filed
as Crim. Case No. 825). The accused were arrested by the Swedish Navy on May 26, 2009
after attempting to hijack the Greek MV Antonis. Swedish Navy Hands Suspected Pirates to
Kenya, LOCAL (Sweden), June 9, 2009, http://www.thelocal.se/19954/20090609/. They
were handed over to Kenyan officials on June 8, 2009 and were charged on June 9, 2009.
Shafili Hirsi Ahmed, Crim. Case No. 2463. This case was initially filed at the Malindi Law
Courts as Criminal Case 825 of 2009, but was subsequently moved to Mombasa. An issue
arose because one of the accused is allegedly only fourteen years old. The magistrate
hearing the matter ordered on June 9, 2009 that the accused be remanded to the Children’s
Remand Home. However, in a motion that same afternoon, the accused asserted that he was
sixteen years old, and the court referred him for age assessment.
127. (2009) Crim. Case No. 840 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). In early March,
2009, the accused were captured by the German Navy when they attempted to hijack the
German MV Courier. French Frigate Delivers Alleged Pirates to Kenya as Trial Begins,
TOPNEWS, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.topnews.in/french-frigate-delivers-alleged-pirateskenya-trial-begins-2155278. Their trial began on April 22, 2009 in Kenya. Id.
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of the Constitution. Remarkably, in Republic v. Mohamud Abdi Kheyre &
6 Others 128 (142-day delay), the suspects were handed over to the Kenyan
authorities on March 5, 2009, but they were not charged until June 3, 2009.
Even if Kenyan courts arrive at the conclusion that Kenya’s
constitutional requirement that suspects be charged within twenty-four
hours does not apply extraterritorially, rules of international law mandate
that the courts take into consideration the rights of all persons who are
criminally charged before them. 129 In the ideal scenario contemplated by
Article 105 of UNCLOS, 130 suspects should be charged in the countries of
the navies that captured them. Unsurprisingly, in almost all the piracy
cases going on in Kenya, the accused have repeatedly argued that Kenyan
courts lack jurisdiction over them. 131 For example, in Mohamud Mohamed
Hashi, the piracy suspects argued that they were brought into court seven
days after their arrest, notwithstanding the fact that they were transported to
Kenya via helicopter within hours of their interdiction on the high seas.
However, no reason was given for the delay in bringing them to court
within the constitutionally required twenty-four-hour time period. 132 In
April 2009, a French court rejected similar arguments challenging the arrest
and transfer of two piracy suspects into France.133
The March 6, 2009 Exchange of Letters Between the European Union
and Kenya on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons
Suspected of Having Committed Acts of Piracy134 (EU-Kenya
128. (2009) Crim. Case No. 791 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya). The accused
were captured by the United States Navy on February 11, 2009 after they attempted to
hijack the Marshall Islands’ Polaris. Mike Mount, U.S. Close to Handing Pirate Suspects to
Kenya,
CNN.COM,
Mar.
4,
2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/03/04/us.kenya.pirates/index.html. They were
not charged by Kenya until July 1, 2009. Kenya: U.S. Officer Tells of Pirate Attack, DAILY
NATION (Kenya), July 2, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200907021096.html. Notably,
the Charge Sheet in the Court file lists March 5, 2009. This is perhaps the date of handover
of the suspects to Kenya, in which case the suspects were in U.S. custody between February
11, 2009 and March 5, 2009.
129. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 230(3), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. See also, Douglas Guilfoyle, “Counter-Piracy Law
Enforcement and Human Rights,” 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly , 141
(2010)
130. UNCLOS art 105.
131. For an extended analysis, see James Gathii, Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National
Pirates Under Kenyan and International Law, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 363
(2010).
132. Crim. Case No. 840. These arguments were made by the lawyer for the accused
persons on August 10, 2009. The case is pending a determination on a judicial review
application filed in the High Court of Kenya challenging the constitutionality of the
prosecutions in Kenya.
133. See France Rejects Appeal by Suspected Somali Pirates, REUTERS, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5354Z820090406 (noting that the suspects’ arrest and
transfer to France were unauthorized).
134. Exchange of Letters Between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on
the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Persons Suspected of Having Committed
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Memorandum of Understanding) provides that transferred persons “will be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power, who will decide without delay on the lawfulness of
his detention and will order his release if the detention is not lawful.” 135 In
none of the cases, however, were such inquiries conducted for the suspects
handed over by the EU-Led Naval Force (EUNAVFOR). 136 Unlike courts
in other jurisdictions, Kenyan courts do not have an automatic duty to rule
on the legality of someone’s detention. In Spain, for example, the filing of
charges against two Somali piracy suspects in November, 2009 was
preceded by prosecutors’ requests to the court to decide if it would allow
the filing of charges. 137 The piracy charges in that case arose following an
attack against a Spanish vessel that was allegedly being held by Somali
pirates who were negotiating for a ransom and the release of their two
confederates held by Spain. 138 In the United States, criminal defendants
brought to court without a warrant are entitled to appear before the court in
a pre-trial proceeding known as a Gerstein proceeding, which tests the
validity of the suspects’ detention through a probable cause
determination. 139 In fact, in the United States, criminal defendants are
entitled to two more pre-trial hearings: the initial appearance—the only
one contemplated under Kenyan law—and a preliminary examination.
These safeguards against the unwarranted detention of presumptively
innocent people are not present in Kenyan law.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
This section presents an in-depth look at many of the procedural
deficiencies in the current piracy prosecutions. First, Kenyan law does not
allow for assessors who act as jurors in criminal trials except for offenses
Acts of Piracy and Detained by the European Union-Led Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), and
Seized Property in the Possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for
Their Treatment After Such Transfer, Annex, 2009 O.J. (L 79) 52 [hereinafter Annex to
Exchange of Letters].
135. Id. at 56.
136. Assuming that such an inquiry would be conducted in a Kenyan court runs up
against Article 8 (a) of the Memorandum, which only empowers “competent” Kenyan and
EU authorities to resolve any issues relating to the interpretation and application of the
Memorandum. Id. at 53. Further, Article 8(b) specifies that disputes concerning
interpretation or application of the provisions of the Memorandum shall be “settled
exclusively by diplomatic means,” essentially denying the Memorandum any foundation as
a legal basis for judicial enforcement. Id.
137. Daniel Woolls, Spain Moves to End Piracy Hostage Crisis, Seeking Quick Trial of 2
Somali
Suspects,
BLOG
TAGARANA,
Nov.16,
2009,
http://blog.taragana.com/law/2009/11/16/spain-moves-to-end-piracy-hostage-crisis-seekingquick-trial-of-2-somali-suspects-16901/.
138. Id.
139. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires a timely judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to detention).
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for which the death penalty is available.140 Additionally, Miranda rights,
which must be administered to criminal defendants upon arrest in the
United States, 141 have no equivalent in Kenya. Another difference is the
role of representation. In the United States, defendants have the right to
adequate legal representation (i.e., the lawyer must do a reasonably good
job defending the accused person). 142 While the Kenyan Criminal Code
and Constitution guarantee a defendant’s right to have a lawyer, unlike in
the United States, there is no guarantee of adequate legal representation. 143
Therefore, piracy suspects who do not receive adequate assistance of
counsel in Kenya cannot impugn their trial. In addition, in both the United
States and in the European Union, unlike in Kenya, suspects are guaranteed
access to a lawyer not merely in court, but also in the initial stages of a
police interrogation. As such, Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights guarantees the right to a fair trial and provides penalties
where an accused person is denied access to a lawyer in the first forty-eight
hours of detention. 144 The procedural differences make successful
prosecutions much more likely in Kenya, even if other countries have an
equal—if not superior—claim of jurisdiction.
A. Witness Attendance Problems
In all the ongoing piracy cases in Mombasa, the attendance of both
foreign and local witnesses has continually delayed the proceedings. For
example, on August 19, 2009, when a hearing was scheduled to begin in
Said Mohamed Ahmed, the hearing could not proceed because the
prosecution was unable to procure the attendance of witnesses from
Yemen. Witnesses from Yemen were also not available for the trial in
Republic v. Mohamed Hassan Ali & 5 Others 145 that was scheduled to

140. Kenyan law allows assessors of fact in cases involving the death penalty. These
include robbery with violence, murder, and treason. The judge, however, is not bound by
the finding of the assessors. See Criminal Procedure Code, (2009) Cap. 75 § 322(2)
(Kenya) (“If the accused person is convicted, the judge shall pass sentence on him according
to law.”). Piracy is not one of the offenses for which assessors participate in a nonbinding
assessment of the facts.
141. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1996) (holding that statements are
inadmissible when a suspect is not appraised of his right to consult with an attorney or the
right to have one present during interrogation).
142. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (holding that criminal
defendants have a right to effective assistance of counsel).
143. See Criminal Procedure Code, (2009) Cap. 75 § 193 (Kenya) (“A person accused of
an offence before a criminal court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this
Code in a criminal court, may of right be defended by an advocate.”).
144. Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 37-40, 48
(1996). For more see Basil Ugochukwu, “Comparative Fair Trial: Between the African and
European
Human
Rights
Systems,”
see
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579844
145. (2009) Crim. Case No. 1694 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya).
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begin September 23, 2009. 146 As of February 2, 2010, five prosecution
witnesses had been heard in this case.
In Said Abdallah Haji, the prosecution was unable to proceed, citing a
breakdown with the EU Command Liaison on production of witnesses. On
December 10, 2009 prosecution witnesses expected from Nairobi did not
show up. Defense lawyers again objected to having not been provided with
witness statements and for an adjournment of trial. On both occasions,
they were overruled. Further delay in this case is expected pending an
assignment of a new magistrate because the original magistrate assigned to
hear the case has been transferred.
Delays related to witness attendance from France in Liban Ahmed Ali
have also arisen. When the prosecution repeatedly sought hearing dates
convenient for the witnesses to testify, the defense objected to the delays
but was overruled by the court. The nonappearance of accused persons in
court, and sometimes even of their defense counsel, as well as congestion
in the court calendar,147 have resulted in continuing delays and sporadic
hearings. In early January, 2010, the prosecution in Liban Ahmed Ali
continued arguing that their international witnesses were still abroad, and it
was not until February, 2010 that they eventually testified. The hearing
was still scheduled to continue at the end of March 2010. Charges in this
case had originally been brought on March, 23 2009.
The delays occasioned by the lack of witness attendance have certainly
affected the piracy suspects’ rights to a speedy trial as guaranteed by
section 77(1) of the Kenyan Constitution.148 The High Court held in
Republic v. William Maina Wamondo 149 that such a delay not only
contravenes the Constitution but also Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The Court declined to give the prosecution a
request for an adjournment since the case had been fixed for hearing one
year before, and the prosecution failed to produce the witnesses and
evidence necessary to successfully prosecute its case. Citing section
306(1)of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court then proceeded to
acquit the accused person in the case because there was insufficient
evidence to carry the government’s burden.150 Similarly, in Republic v.

146. Criminal Case No. 1694 and Criminal Case No. 1784 were consolidated on
September 2, 2009 because they involved the same alleged piracy incident.
147. For instance, on December 16, 2009, the court ruled that a scheduled hearing could
not proceed because of the lateness of the hour.
148. For a discussion of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants in Kenya, see
supra Part II.A.
149. (2003) Crim. Case No. 133 (H.C.K.) (Nyeri, Kenya).
150. Id.; see also Criminal Procedure Code, (2009) Cap. 75 § 306(1) (Kenya) (providing
for the acquittal of the defendant if, after the close of the prosecution’s case, the evidence
adduced does not establish guilt).
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Martin Nyongesa Wefwafwa, 151 the High Court held:
[An] accused person cannot be detained in custody forever at the whims
of the prosecution [and] . . . adjournments should not be granted as a
matter of course even when it is evident that the police . . . are sleeping
on their job and are not making any efforts to have the witnesses come to
152
court.

B. Who Are the Complainants in the Piracy Cases: The Flag State,
Kenya, or the Capturing States?
Under Kenyan criminal law, the complainant in a criminal case must,
through the prosecution, present his or her evidence to enable the court to
determine if an accused person is properly charged and if the accused
person should be put on his defense. 153 Kenyan courts are empowered to
issue arrest warrants for persons so charged. 154 However such arrest
warrants are intended to be executed only within Kenya. 155 This does not
preclude the possibility that individuals may be charged without a warrant
since making a complaint or bringing the person before a magistrate is also
sufficient to institute criminal proceedings.156 In fact, a court in Kenya can
issue an arrest warrant for a person located outside of the country, and such
a warrant may be executed outside the country. 157 However, this process
laid down under Kenyan law is not followed in piracy cases.
Kenyan law requires that a complaint be signed by the complainant in
addition to the magistrate. 158 Nonappearance by a complainant at the
hearing of the case, when the accused person appears, can result in
acquittal. 159 Defense attorneys have argued that the nonappearance of the
crews of attacked ships at hearings serves as the basis for dismissing the
case on the premise that the crews and passengers of those vessels were the
151. (2004) Crim. Case No. 72 (H.C.K.) (Bungoma, Kenya).
152. Id.
153. See Criminal Procedure Code, (2009) Cap. 75 § 89(1) (Kenya) (providing that
“[p]roceedings may be instituted either by the making of a complaint or by the bringing
before a magistrate of a person who has been arrested without warrant”).
154. Id. § 90(1).
155. Id. § 109.
156. Id. § 89(1).
157. See id. § 110(1) (“When a warrant of arrest is to be executed outside the local limits
of the jurisdiction of the court issuing it, the court may, instead of directing the warrant to a
police officer, forward it by post or otherwise to a magistrate within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction it is to be executed.”). Such a warrant needs the endorsement of a
magistrate “within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it is to be executed.” Id. § 111(1).
However, if delay would be occasioned in obtaining such endorsement, the police officer to
whom it is directed may be assisted by local police officers in executing the warrant. Id. §
111(3).
158. Id. § 89(3).
159. See id. § 202 (specifying further that the court retains the discretion not to acquit the
accused person in these circumstances if there is a proper reason to adjourn the case to
another date).
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proper complainants under sections 89(3) and 202 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
In Mohamed Hassan Ali, for example, the defense applied for acquittal
on the ground that the witnesses the prosecution produced for the hearing
that day were not the captain, crew, or other persons aboard the vessel
allegedly subjected to piratical attack. The defense argued that without the
complainants, the accused persons could not receive a fair trial. The
prosecution argued that the Kenyan state, rather than the crew of the vessel,
was the complainant in the case and was properly represented by the
prosecution. According to the prosecution, the piracy cases were “special
ones” in which the complainant’s were the flag states on whose behalf the
government of Kenya was acting. The court overruled the defense’s
application to have the accused acquitted and agreed with the prosecution
that piracy cases are “special” because they involve offenses that traverse
national and international boundaries—which according to the court made
the state the complainant.
The theory that the proper complainants in piracy cases are the flag
states of the vessels raises more questions than it answers. First, this
argument does not comport with the fact that the suspects are often
captured by navies of countries other than the flag states who then
handover the suspects to Kenya under agreements to which the flag vessels
are often not parties. This suggests that the governments of the navies that
captured the suspected pirates are the proper complainants as contemplated
under Article 105 of UNCLOS. 160
Second, the fact that Kenya has agreed to prosecute the suspected pirates
does not make Kenya the appropriate complainant. The offenses are
committed against the vessel, its crew, and the goods it carried, not Kenya
itself. This raises many complexities given that crew members are often
comprised of different nationalities than the flag state and the owners of the
goods carried on the vessel. Further, given that piracy is conceptualized as
a crime against all of human-kind, anyone could be a complainant. Clarity
regarding the proper complainants in the piracy cases becomes crucial.
The Kenyan government argues that it is the proper complainant and that
the parties directly affected by the alleged offenses and those that took part
in arresting the suspects assume no direct responsibility to appear in court.
Kenya’s criminal procedure law is designed for criminal cases that occur
within the territorial jurisdiction of the particular magistrate’s court where

160. See UNCLOS, supra note 130, at 397 (“On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship . . . or a ship . . .
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons . . . . The courts of
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed . . . .”).
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the attendance of the complainant and witnesses is possible.161 Grafting the
piracy prosecutions onto this system and justifying them as “special”
obscures their character and simply does not work. 162
Potential
modifications to make the piracy prosecutions fit the circumstances of
Kenyan courts raise important questions about due process, such as
whether the burden of proving that the suspects committed the offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt can be met by introducing witnesses other than
the ones allegedly subjected to piratical attacks.
The European Union has funded the efforts of the Nairobi-based
UNODC to assist in accommodating the logistical issues presented by the
prosecution of pirates. The funding focuses on the attendance of witnesses
and other matters to ensure that trials are conducted efficaciously.
UNODC’s role is crucial in successfully prosecuting piracy cases because
it bridges the gap between the commission of the alleged offenses on the
high seas and the fact that Kenya’s criminal justice system is designed for
offenses committed within Kenya.
C. The Role of the UNODC, the Anti-Piracy Unit, and UN-Funded
Interpreters
The UNODC has funded the training of judges, magistrates, and
prosecutors involved in piracy prosecutions; helped in getting witnesses
from abroad to come to trial; funded a revamped Shimo La Tewa prison in
Mombasa where the piracy suspects have been held; provided legal
resources, office equipment, transportation assistance, and fuel for
prosecutors; and supplied the Kenyan police with training in investigation
procedures, investigative equipment, and the safe transport of weapons for
ballistic examination in Nairobi.163 UNODC has also funded the refitting
of an exhibit room to secure and stow firearms. 164
The assistance provided by the UNODC illustrates the general logistical
challenges attendant in the prosecution of cases in Kenya, not to mention
the complexities added when prosecuting extra-territorial offenses.
UNODC is essentially retrofitting the Kenyan criminal justice system,
which is already heavily backlogged and bedeviled by basic problems such
161. See generally GATHII, supra note 59 (providing a lengthy discussion of the
territorial jurisdiction of magistrate courts to try piracy suspects, and noting that the
language of the Magistrate’s Courts Act strongly suggests that these courts only have
territorial jurisdiction).
162. See Bahar, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 82–85 (discussing the
limits of Kenya’s legal system in the piracy prosecutions).
163. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COUNTER PIRACY PROGRAMME 3–4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica//piracy/UNODC_Counter_Piracy_Program
me.pdf.
164. Id. at 3.
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as inadequate prison space, inadequate investigatory resources for the
police, and courts with inadequate office equipment and methods of recordkeeping. 165 Kenya has an especially rudimentary criminal justice system in
which suspects are held for long periods of time in prison while awaiting
trial without adequate basic needs such as clean water and medical care and
where corruption in the judiciary is legendary. 166 The European Union has
appropriated 1.75 million Euros to support UNODC’s work for the judicial
and penal reforms in return for Kenya agreeing to prosecute the piracy
suspects. 167 The prison warden at the Shimo La Tewa Prison, which has
received several upgrades including mattresses for the prisoners and a new
kitchen and sewerage system, has argued that the piracy suspects have
turned out to be “a blessing in disguise.” 168
Although the UNODC has argued that it is extending assistance to
defense lawyers in two of the piracy cases, the overwhelming assistance
rendered so far has been to the police, the prosecution, the Shimo La Tewa
prison, and the courts in Mombasa. Even the training that has been
conducted by the UNODC has not included defense attorneys. 169 In
addition, severe limitations placed on piracy suspects’ ability to
165. See generally GATHII, supra note 59, at 25 (discussing concerns about the general
competence of the Kenyan courts to conduct the piracy prosecutions).
166. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UN SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL, ARBITRARY OR SUMMARY EXECUTIONS MISSION TO KENYA
16–25
FEBRUARY
2009
(Feb.
25,
2009),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=8673&LangID=
E (noting that the majority of Kenyans with whom the author spoke viewed the Kenyan
judiciary as corrupt despite contrary views by judges within the system); see also KENYA
NAT’L COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON EXTRA-JUDICIAL KILLINGS AND
DISAPPEARANCES—OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT AND SAMPLE CASES 2–18 (2007) (detailing
the most basic failures of the Kenyan criminal justice system, including instances where
Kenyan police extrajudicially executed a suspect).
167. See Letter from the Minister for Eur. to the European Scrutiny Comm. of the U.K.
Parliament (Sept. 7, 2009), reprinted in HOUSE OF COMMONS EUROPEAN SCRUTINY
COMMITTEE, DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OCTOBER 14, 2009, 2008–9,
H.C.
19-xxvii,
at
153–54,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/19xxvii/1932.htm
(providing the committee with a detailed update on piracy-related activity).
168. McConnell, supra note 119; see also Nicholas Cage Visits Kenyan Prison, AFRICA
NEWS, Nov. 17, 2009, available at LEXIS, News Library, Most Recent Two Years File
(noting that the prison was one of the warmest of the world after visiting it.). But see Kenya
Ends
Somali
Pirates’
Trials,
BBC,
Apr.
1,
2010,
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8599347.stm.
For example, a member of Kenya’s
Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations stated that the failure to
deliver promised funds for constructing the water and sewage system and painting the
Shimo la Tewa prison where the piracy suspects are held was a reason to withdraw from the
prosecution agreements.
169. McConnell, supra note 119 (citing defense lawyer Oruko Nyarwinda, who is
critical of the “lopsided” nature of the assistance given to the prosecution and the courts by
the UNODC); see also, Jeffrey Gettleman, Rounding Up Suspects, the West Turns to Kenya
as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A8 (noting that defense attorney
Francis Kadima has represented a total of thirty-two pirates and has not been paid anything
for any of the cases).
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communicate with their relatives in Somalia which hinders their ability to
raise money to ensure effective defense work. The UNODC’s assistance
with the piracy prosecutions has at times constituted unwarranted
overreaching. For example, in Mohamed Hassan Ali, the UNODC paid for
the appearance of a Spanish interpreter. The defense objected to a
UNODC-paid interpreter on the basis that the UNODC was a third party to
the proceedings and that the interpreter would likely engage in a “stage
managed translation.” The defense sought an independent court approved
translator to ensure fairness in the trial. In a rare victory for the defense in
piracy cases, the court agreed that allowing a UNODC-paid translator
would undermine the integrity of the proceedings against the accused and
ordered that an approved translator be provided. Notably, in Said Abdallah
Haji, the prosecution applied to have an Italian naval officer who worked
on the ship that arrested the accused person to serve as an interpreter for the
other officers aboard the vessel. Oddly, the defense lawyers did not object
to having a person who was a witness himself to serve as an interpreter for
the prosecution, even though the same arguments could have been made
about not having a court-appointed interpreter as in Mohamed Hassan Ali.
The difference in how interpreters in the two cases were treated, albeit in a
very analogous factual circumstance, suggests that defense attorneys in the
various piracy cases are unevenly trained and share no overarching
strategy. 170
While the support the UNODC has provided the Kenyan criminal justice
system in return for prosecution of the piracy suspects has been invaluable,
the example of a UNODC-funded interpreter, who the court agreed might
not be impartial, illustrates the danger of UNODC over-involvement, which
may tilt the balance too heavily in favor of the prosecution without regard
to the rights of the accused. The failure to provide an interpreter to an
accused person in a criminal case contravenes section 77(2)(f) of the
Kenyan Constitution 171 and is grounds for an acquittal because it violates
an accused person’s right to an interpretation of the evidence in a language
he understands. 172
170. See Sarah Childress, Legal Limbo Awaits Somali Pirates, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703961104575225810196963690.html?mo
d=WSJ_latestheadlines (describing the challenges in conducting the piracy trials in Kenya
and the burden they are placing onand noting that one of the defense lawyers in the trials has
filed numerous objections to evidence, bail hearings, and other issues and has lost on all but
one).
171. CONSTITUTION, Art. 77(2)(f) (2008) (Kenya) (providing that “[e]very person who is
charged with a criminal offence . . . shall be permitted to have without payment the
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the
charge”).
172. See Joseph Kamau Gitau v. Republic, (2002) Crim. App. 1002 (H.C.K.) (Nairobi,
Kenya) (granting an acquittal on appeal partly because the appellant was not provided with
an interpreter in violation of Article 77(2)(f) of the Constitution).
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D. Production of Video Evidence
One of the most significant issues that has arisen concerns the production
of DVD evidence containing the voice recordings of the distress calls and
footage from vessels allegedly subjected to piratical attacks. In Mohamed
Hassan Ali, the defense objected to the production of recordings by an
officer of the Spanish warship that arrested the piracy suspects because
Kenyan law requires the person who made the recording to be the one to
produce it in court. The defendants argued that having the officer produce
the DVD evidence would deny them the opportunity to cross-examine its
makers and that the evidence could just as easily be adduced orally. The
court rejected the objections and held that it amounted to preventing the
prosecution from adducing evidence even before the witnesses who had
made the DVD recording could be put it on the stand.
While the court did not outright foreclose the possibility of entertaining
the objection in the future, the defense’s objection and the inability to file
an appeal to the High Court illustrates the limits facing the defense in these
cases. With insufficient resources to file appeals, the odds seem to be
stacked in favor of the prosecution. Similar objections to the production of
DVD evidence were made by the defense in Mohamud Abdi Kheyre. The
defense argued that it had not been supplied with the DVD to review prior
to trial and that it therefore could not consult with the accused persons nor
conduct cross-examination effectively. In addition, the defense raised
doubts regarding the DVD’s authenticity because the recording occurred
outside of the country. The court overruled the objections but gave the
defense an opportunity to review the video evidence before it was
eventually produced.
The Kenyan Court of Appeal has held that a video-tape recording is
admissible as evidence “provided that a proper foundation for its reception
has been laid.” 173 The Court of Appeal further noted that, like the
admissibility of voice-tape recordings, the admissibility of video-taped
evidence can be relied upon where “the voices recorded can be properly
identified,” keeping in mind that “[s]uch evidence should always be
regarded with some caution and assessed in light of all the circumstances of
each case.” 174 In light of the foregoing statements by the Court of Appeal,
defendants’ objections to the production of DVD evidence are founded on
established precedents.
173. See Jane Betty Mwaiseje & 2 Others v. Republic, (1991) Crim. App. 17 (C.A.K.)
(Kenya) (analogizing the use of video-tape recording to the use of tape-recordings). See
generally id. (holding that a video-tape recording is admissible as evidence, yet noting that
the officer performing the video-tape recording must notify the accused and ask the
accused’s consent before proceeding).
174. Id. (citing Republic v. Masqud Ali, [1965] EWCA (Crim) 2, 1965 All E.R. 464, 464
(Eng.)).
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In a report on its efforts to support the prosecutions in Kenya, the
UNODC has noted that “Kenyan authorities have reported that the current
Evidence Act is generally outdated and too formal[]” and that “[s]ome
modern forms of evidence may not be admissible [while] others may only
be admitted through onerous procedures.” 175 The report recommends
“urgent legislative review”, some of which could be done expeditiously
through an administrative process of “gazetting” to “ensure efficient and
fair prosecutions.” 176 As discussed above, the UNODC’s role in this
context constitutes a very objectionable form of over-reaching into the
legislative process in Kenya—it encroaches the sovereignty of the country
by making laws for its internal governance with direction from
international organizations. This kind of reform, even while debatably
desirable outside the context of piracy prosecutions, would, if designed to
propel the piracy prosecutions further, amplify the intrusiveness of the EU
into Kenya’s internal affairs. 177
E. Defense Requests to Visit the Scene of the Crime and Judicial Notice
in Place of Proof
Kenyan law allows the defense to request a visit to the scene of a crime
by a criminal defendant. In Said Abdallah Haji, for example, the defense
applied to visit the scene of the crime and the vessel allegedly involved to
resolve questions regarding a lack of video evidence. The defense lawyers
argued that such a visit would have provided them with the information
necessary to properly defend their clients.
In opposing the application, the prosecution argued that the court should
take judicial notice of the existence of rampant piratical attacks in the Gulf
of Aden. Further, the prosecution argued that the pirated vessels were no
longer present at the scene of the crime. The court dismissed the defense’s
application, yet took judicial notice of the physical aspects of the case,
perhaps alluding to where the offense occurred and that the defense was at
liberty to call any witnesses to establish any facts to the contrary. In effect,
the court seemed to place the burden on the defense to prove that the
offense did not occur and suggested that the inherent logistical difficulties
and security situation in the Gulf of Aden prevented the court from

175. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME & EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU SUPPORT
TO THE TRIAL AND RELATED TREATMENT OF PIRACY SUSPECTS 6 (2009).
176. Id.
177. This would be inconsistent with the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs
safeguarded by Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. See U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . . .
.”).
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proceeding to the scene of the crime. The defense filed an appeal of this
ruling to the High Court. As of March 1, 2010, the application is still
pending.
A defendant’s request to visit the scene of an alleged piratical attack is
reasonable because the prosecutions in Kenya are often justified by the
country’s proximity to the location of the offenses. Because the
prosecutions are heavily supported by the UNODC, it would seem only fair
for Kenyan courts to seriously consider applications to visit the scene of the
offenses to verify that the locations are indeed on the high seas. The
alternative, as happened in Said Abdallah Haji, is that the court may simply
decide to take judicial notice of the location of the offenses. Judicial notice
of facts is generally taken only when the facts are so irrefutable that there is
no need to tender evidence to prove them. To take judicial notice regarding
the location of the alleged piracy offenses is to lift the burden from the
prosecution to prove that the offenses occurred on the high seas, where the
offenses constitute piracy under Kenyan and international law.178 Notably,
none of the charge sheets in the piracy cases allege with specificity the
location off the coast of the alleged offenses. As such, the defense may
request a visit to the scene of the offense. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court
has on occasion reversed indictments that improperly identified the venue
of the offense. 179
Magistrate courts have invoked judicial notice in other contexts as well,
for example, in response to allegations by accused persons that they have
been subjected to beatings by prison wardens or other prisoners; that they
have not received sufficient health care attention; and that Kenyan prisons
are generally congested. Such a finding was made in Republic v. Mohamed
Abdi Kheyre & 6 Others, 180 where the accused person alleged that they
were beaten and denied food and that the prison was over-crowded. The
court issued an order cautioning the prison authorities to treat the accused
persons “according to laid down procedures.”
Prison conditions at Shimo La Tewa remain harsh and congested despite
significant reforms. The assistance of the UNODC and the warden’s
decision to open up the prison to local human rights organizations like
Kituo Cha Sheria in Mombasa to scrutinize the prison and conduct rights
education are important strides in correcting the problem. The UNODC
has argued, however, that it has to provide assistance to the piracy suspects
in a manner that does not privilege them above other prisoners or the prison
178. See generally GATHII, supra note 59 (discussing the relevance of the crime’s
location to jurisdictional concerns).
179. See, e.g., Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 636-37 (1961) (holding that venue
was improperly laid in Colorado and should have been in the District of Colombia).
180. (2009) Crim. Case No. 791 (Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya).

GATHII AUTHORREVIEWJUNE2(3).DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

136

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/4/2010 1:43 PM

[Vol. 59:nnn

wardens themselves.
F. Allegations of Torture, Mistreatment, and Denial of Bail
In its agreement with the EU, Kenya agreed to ensure that piracy
suspects were humanely treated and provided with “adequate
accommodation and nourishment, [and] access to medical treatment” in
addition to all the guarantees of a fair trial. 181 The agreement provides that
the suspects will be treated “in accordance with international human rights
obligations, including the prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhumane
and degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of arbitrary
detention and in accordance with the requirement to have a fair trial.”182
The agreement further specifies, in more detail than Kenyan law, that the
piracy suspects have not only a right to a prompt trial, but a right to be
released if it is determined that their detention is unlawful.183 The EU also
agreed to provide assistance to secure the attendance of witnesses. 184 The
agreement also provides national and humanitarian agencies,185 as well as
representatives of the EU and EUNAVFOR, with access to persons
detained pursuant to the agreement. 186
An EU delegation visited Kenya between March 29, 2009 and April 1,
2009 to assess how much funding the country would need to continue to
detain and try piracy suspects; an amount of 1.74 million Euros was
proposed. 187 This money is being used to support piracy prosecutions by
an EU-UNODC Counter-Piracy Program through supporting the work of
police investigators, prosecutors, courts, and prisons. It was hoped that this
money would reduce the incidence of beatings, lack of health care, and
prison overcrowding, as mentioned above. Even with these interventions,
the conditions of confinement for the piracy suspects are crowded. There
181. Annex to Exchange of Letters, supra note 134, at 51.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Id. at 56–57.
184. Id. at 58 (setting forth articles 6(a) & (b)(3) of the Provisions on the Conditions of
Transfer of Suspected Pirates and Seized Property From the EU-Led Naval Force to the
Republic of Kenya).
185. Id. at 57-58 (setting forth article 5(f) of the Provisions on the Conditions of Transfer
of Suspected Pirates and Seized Property From the EU-Led Naval Force to the Republic of
Kenya).
186. Id. at 57 (setting forth article 5(e) of the Provisions on the Conditions of Transfer of
Suspected Pirates and Seized Property From the EU-Led Naval Force to the Republic of
Kenya).
187. 492 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2009) 465W, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090508/text/90508w000
7.htm. In response to a question, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told the
House of Commons on May, 14 2009 that the German Ambassador to Kenya had visited
pirates transferred to Kenya by German forces on March 10, 2009 and April 8, 2009. 492
PARL.
DEB.,
H.C.
(6th
ser.)
(2009)
921W,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090514/text/90514w001
0.htm#09051458000122.
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are 48,000 other criminal suspects and convicts held in Kenya’s 90
prisons. 188 This is estimated to amount to an overcrowding rate of 344
percent. 189 This contrasts with the standards of the custodial facilities in
the United States and in the European Union. Unsurprisingly, the piracy
suspects have continually requested to be tried in the countries of the
navies that arrested them. 190
All the piracy suspects have applied for but have been denied bail
without exception. 191 In arguing against applications for bail, prosecutors
have emphasized that the offenses with which the suspects are charged are
serious, their identities and places of abode are not known, and the right to
bail is not absolute. 192 However, the Kenyan High Court has categorically
rejected such outright denials of bail in terse terms, holding that:
Unless it can be shown that an accused person will be tried within a
reasonable time, if he is facing any offence not punishable by death, then
he is entitled to bail as a matter of law (the law here being Section 72(5)
of the Constitution), and the courts (subordinate or the High Court) have
no discretion in the matter. The only discretion given to the court under
the said provision of the Constitution is as to whether the accused should
193
be released unconditionally or conditionally.

The prosecution in piracy cases arguably operate outside the
jurisprudence developed by Kenyan courts, and the bail context is just one
of many instances in which piracy suspects are subjected to double
standards in accessing their procedural rights. However, in other contexts,
piracy suspects are receiving a lot of attention from the heavily-funded
188. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: KENYA 3 (2010),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135959.htm.
189. See Martin Schonteich, Pre-Trial Detention in Africa, Civil Society Prison Reform
Initiative
(CSPRI)
Newsletter,
Jan.
2006,
at
2,
available
at
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reforminitiative/newsletters/newsletter/newsletter%2015.pdf/.
190
For example, in Republic v. Mohamud Abdi Kheyre & 6 Others, supra note 128,
Abdullahi Ahmed Hussein, accused person number four, told the court on 29th July, 2009
that he had no faith in Kenyan courts and that he wanted to be taken to the country of the
people who had arrested him for trial. See also in R v Juma Abdikadir Farah, supra note_,
where on July 22nd 2009 all the accused persons told the courts that they had no faith in
Kenyan courts and requested they either be repatriated to Somalia or for trial in the country
that had effected their arrest.
191
For example, in R v Said Abdullah Haji, supra note _, Senior Superintendant of Police
Gibson Wanderi for the prosecution argued against a bail application on 26th of June 2009
because the offense with which the accused was charged was very serious, their identities
and places of abode were unknown and if released would likely abscond and that the right to
bail was not absolute. The court agreed with the prosecution in rejecting the bail application.
Bail was denied in all other piracy cases discussed in this article on the same grounds.
192. See, e.g., Republic v. Said Abdallah Haji & 8 Others, (2009) Crim. Case No. 2127
(Chief Magis. Ct.) (Mombasa, Kenya).
193. Musyoki v. Republic, (2004) Crim. Applic. No. 646 (H.C.K.) (Nairobi, Kenya)
(quoting Very Odeougu v. Republic, (1998) Crim. Applic. Nos. 427 & 428) (Kenya)).
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UNODC program as it tries to ensure their expeditious prosecution.
CONCLUSION
Piracy is regarded as an offense that states have universal jurisdiction to
prosecute. This exercise of universal jurisdiction is meant to protect
commercial shipping on the high seas. Although there is no obligation to
prosecute pirates once captured, Kenya has volunteered to prosecute piracy
suspects captured off the coast of Somalia. Hence, while a few centuries
ago countries negotiated with pirates to ensure safe passage on the high
seas, today, the United States, the European Union, and other naval powers
use their armed forces to interdict pirates on the high seas and funnel them
to Kenya—and perhaps in the future, to the Seychelles—for prosecution.
This Article illustrates the many problems that have beset these
prosecutions. These problems reflect the lack of internationally agreed
upon standards for conducting piracy prosecutions and highlight the
inadequacy of Kenya’s criminal justice system. In the absence of
international standards for piracy prosecutions, each country assuming the
responsibility for the prosecutions uses its own domestic legal system. The
UNODC has tried propping up the entire system, including the courts, the
prosecution, the police, and the prison system, with a view to having
prosecutions that withstand international scrutiny. The problems addressed
in this Article include: poor witness attendance compromising the right to
speedy trials; questions regarding the proper complainants in piracy
prosecutions; and the overreaching of the UNODC in Kenya’s criminal
justice system, including the attempt to circumvent the regular process of
legislative enactment and amendment. These issues, among others,
undermine the efficacy of piracy trials. 194 Turkey, a member of the United
Nations Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, has written to
the Secretary General of the United Nations requesting the establishment of
an international mechanism to try piracy suspects.195 As this Article shows,
piracy trials in Kenya were not well-planned in advance. The trials were
hurriedly convened to prevent further embarrassment to European Union
governments, who are unwilling to engage in prosecutions at home, but
saddled with piracy suspects aboard their naval ships off the coast of
Somalia. The Kenyan legal system was not designed to prosecute nonnationals for crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, but this is

194. See generally Bakano, supra note 80 (providing a summary of some of the broader
obstacles faced by piracy trials in Kenya).
195. David Osler, UN Asked to Oversee Piracy Trials, LLOYD’S LIST, Jan. 7, 2010,
http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/un-asked-to-oversee-piracytrials/20017735221.htm;jsessionid=751604F0D3B9DADEDCD47C8DA137D3AF.065acf6
a61c52eed94766d1ba7da5d95d4ecd58a.
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exactly what it has been asked to do. As a result, piracy prosecutions in
Kenya are but a grand experiment in international justice being conducted
in an ill-prepared and overcrowded criminal justice system. For a crime
that spans centuries, the trials in Kenya demonstrate that this experiment in
international justice is still in its infancy and far from operating efficiently.

